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The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experi-
mental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection
of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they
relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous ﬁndings of the
fMRI correlates of free choice, deﬁned objectively. We introduced a novel task in which
participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. BOLD responses
for conditions subjectively experienced as free identiﬁed a postcentral area distinct from
the areas typically considered to be involved in free action. Thus, the brain correlates of
subjective feeling of free action were not directly related to any established brain correlates
of objectively-deﬁned free action. Our results call into question traditional assumptions
about the relation between subjective experience of choosing and activity in the brain’s
so-called voluntary motor areas.
 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Debates over whether humans have the capacity to make free choices have been ongoing for several centuries (Libet,
1999; Thomas, 1894; Wegner, 2002). In contrast, there is wider consensus about the existence of a subjective experience
of acting freely (Sarkissian et al., 2010). We often have the impression that our internal conscious decisions drive our behav-
iour. In other words, we feel that our decisions and actions are not simple determined by the immediate environment, but
rather expressions of our ‘‘agentic self’’ (Kane, 2005; Schüür & Haggard, 2011).
According to one view, these subjective experiences are illusory (Wegner, 2002), and the ‘‘conscious will’’ is merely a ret-
rospective inference, rather than a direct readout of brain activity associated with action selection or action generation. The
experimental studies supporting this view largely used behavioural methods to identify ‘‘illusions of will’’ (Wegner &Wheat-
ley, 1999), and to manipulate their intensity (Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Further support for this view comes from electrophys-
iological and neurophysiological recordings (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008).
These studies show that the onset of the neural events associated with free decisions precede the reported onset of the
awareness of intention, and suggest that conscious intention cannot be a causal factor for free decisions. Interestingly, how-
ever, few studies have investigated where in the brain this alleged illusion arises.
Neuroscientiﬁc studies have often deﬁned volition by drawing a distinction between the information-processing under-
lying free and instructed actions. Because this deﬁnition makes no appeal to subjective experience, it has proved particularly
useful in studies with animals (Thaler, Chen, Nixon, Stern, & Passingham, 1995). In this operationalization, instructed actionsany. Fax:
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type of action are explicitly speciﬁed (the when and what of action (Brass & Haggard, 2008)). In contrast, free actions leave
either the ‘‘what’’ or the ‘‘when’’ dimension of action underspeciﬁed (‘‘when’’ (Libet et al., 1983; Thaler et al., 1995), ‘‘what’’
(Krieghoff, Brass, Prinz, & Waszak, 2009; Waszak et al., 2005)). Thus, free actions are those which do not entirely depend on
explicit external signals, but depend more strongly on hypothesised internal sources. However, specifying precisely what
these internal sources actually are has proved difﬁcult and controversial (Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2009; Schüür & Hag-
gard, 2011). They may include action goals (Gollwitzer, 1996), or memories (Tanji, 2001). As such, free actions cannot, by
deﬁnition, be strongly related to any single environmental event, although they may be weakly related to a wide range of
environmental inputs (Schüür & Haggard, 2011).
Support for the free vs. instructed account of volition comes partly from primate neuroanatomical evidence (Goldberg,
1985; Passingham, 2007). Lateral portions of the premotor cortices are responsible for instructed or reactive actions driven
by explicit external signals, while medial premotor areas, notably the supplementary motor area (SMA), are responsible for
free, self-generated or ‘‘projectional’’ action. For example, Thaler et al. (1995) showed that removal of the medial premotor
cortex in monkeys impaired their ability to make learnt arbitrary arm movements at their own pace, in order to receive a
food reward. The same monkeys showed less impairment to make the same movement following an external auditory cue.
This account of free choice has been supported by several human neuroimaging studies. The contrast between free and
instructed movement choices has been consistently associated with increased BOLD signal in the SMA and preSMA, the ros-
tral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Cunnington, Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser,
2006; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006), (see Krieghoff, Waszak, Prinz, and Brass
(2011) for a review). In particular, Mueller, Brass, Waszak, and Prinz (2007) have suggested that RCZ is mainly involved in
selecting the ‘‘what’’ component, in the context of a given task (Desmet, Fias, Hartstra, & Brass, 2011); whilst preSMA par-
ticipates in selecting the ‘‘when’’ component of actions. In addition, Thimm, Weidner, Fink, and Sturm (2012) have recently
shown that the BOLD activations generally associated with free choice need not be associated with overt movement. Covert
unrestricted choices between objects also elicited comparable BOLD activations to free selection of motor responses, centred
on the medial frontal cortex regions.
This tradition has therefore capitalised on objective experimental design factors which allow instructed and free
choice to be deﬁned in terms of information that is provided by external cues, or is not so provided. This deﬁnition by-
passes the subjective experience of free choice. However, understanding the neural basis of the common feeling of acting
freely is important. On the one hand, if free choice is indeed illusory, understanding the mechanism underlying illusions
has long been a productive approach in psychological research. On the other hand, if free choice is not illusory then the
neural bases of the subjective experience of free choice may be relevant to understanding how and where free choices
occur in the brain.
The scientiﬁc tradition reviewed above operationalizes voluntary action based on objective criteria. This tradition
implicitly assumes that voluntary action operationalized in this objective way captures the subjective feeling of acting
intentionally. However, this important implicit assumption has never been appropriately validated. If the assumption
is correct, and there is a correspondence between objective and subjective accounts of free action, then the neural cor-
relates of free and instructed choices deﬁned objectively should roughly match with those deﬁned subjectively. We
therefore devised an experimental task in which actions were deﬁned either on the basis of an objective deﬁnition,
or on the basis of subjective experience. We then investigated the brain correlates associated with free choices under
each of the two possible deﬁnitions.
Here we use and extend the classic distinction between instructed and free choice to investigate the neural correlates of
subjective voluntariness. Importantly, we also consider that external guidance can come in varying degrees; so that the in-
structed/free distinction is not a simple dichotomy between two exclusive categories, but rather represents two extremes of
a continuum. On this view, generating an action can involve both internal and external factors. For example, when a driver
brakes or accelerates in response to a trafﬁc signal, they are responding both to the external event of the signal’s colour, but
their action also depends on an arbitrary rule that they have acquired, and chosen to follow. For our purposes, we consider
freedom of choice as a graded measure of how independent an action is from an external stimulus. When an action is
strongly determined by an external stimulus, it will be ‘‘less free’’ than when it is not. We may then ask whether people sub-
jectively experience degrees of voluntariness underlying individual action decisions, and whether this graded experience
originates from graded levels of activation in particular brain areas.
We have adapted the classic task of random number generation (Jahanshahi, Dirnberger, Fuller, & Frith, 2000) to allow
both an objective, graded continuum of integration of stimulus information, and also a graded continuum of subjective expe-
rience of voluntariness regarding action choice. Random number generation tasks have been used before in relation to voli-
tion, but for rather different reasons from ours. In particular, many free selection studies involve asking participants to
produce balanced numbers of responses, while avoiding obvious patterns such as alternation. These tasks have been inter-
preted as covertly asking participants to generate apparently random response sequences (Roepstorff & Frith, 2004). For
example, human positron emission tomography (PET) studies during random number generation tasks have suggested a crit-
ical involvement of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex, the bilateral superior pari-
etal cortex, and the right inferior frontal cortex (Daniels, Witt, Wolff, Jansen, & Deuschl, 2003; Jahanshahi et al., 1995). These
areas partially overlap with those identiﬁed with free selection tasks (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). In our case, a modiﬁed random
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pendence or freedom of action.
Crucially, in two separate analyses, we compared extreme situations of free and instructed action as operationalized by
the classical objective paradigms, and also situations in which actions subjectively felt more free or felt more constrained,
based on self-report. In this way, we hoped to establish the relationship between free actions as traditionally deﬁned, and
the subjective experience of having chosen freely.
In the crucial condition for studying graded voluntariness, we presented a number sequence and asked participants to
complete the sequence with a number that would make the sequence ‘‘look random’’. The method that participants used
to achieve this presumably varied from person to person, depending on their subjective concept of a random sequence. How-
ever, the actual interpretation of ‘‘random appearance’’ was not our central interest here. In contrast we focussed on partic-
ipants’ subjective feeling of voluntariness associated with whatever choices they had in fact made. Subjective, quantitative
report of voluntariness allows us to study the feeling of free choice with high ecological validity. Thus, instructed actions
allow for no ﬂexibility of behaviour, whereas free actions, in the everyday sense, may be the result of an internal evaluation
of the applicability and relative importance of the several different internal rules.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-three healthy participants took part in the study (5 female; mean age 22 ± 2 years). All participants gave written
informed consent. Procedures were approved by the local ethical committee, and were in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No participant had a history of neurological, major med-
ical, or psychiatric disorder.
2.2. Stimuli and procedure
Each participant made manual actions to choose numbers on a screen using a trackball in experimental trials within three
different contexts in a random number generation task.
Each trial proceeded as follows (see Fig. 1). A white ﬁxation cross was displayed on a black background. The ﬁxation dura-
tion was sampled from a pseudologarithmic distribution, and ranged from 2 to 14 s. The ﬁxation cross served as a variable
period constituting an implicit baseline BOLD measure. Immediately after, either a sequence of four numbers (from 1 to 4) or
four X’s appeared on the screen, above a 2  2 response grid. The position of each number in the grid was randomly assigned
and changed in every trial. Participants held an MRI-compatible trackball on their lap. The mouse cursor was displayed on
the screen using a red ‘‘+’’ sign, initially positioned on the centre of the response grid. Participants were instructed to select a
number from the response grid by moving the mouse cursor to the chosen number and clicking on it. The choice of number
was based in the number stem presented (see below). Once the number was selected, it was displayed next to the stem for
0.8 s.
In two of the contexts the question ‘‘How free was your choice?’’ (‘‘Hoe VRIJ voelde je keuze aan?’’ in Dutch) was dis-
played above a visual analogue scale (VAS). The VAS had 10 subdivisions, and its extremes were labelled ‘‘Very free’’ and
‘‘Not free’’ (‘‘HEEL vrij’’ and ‘‘NIET vrij’’). The left–right orientation of the VAS labels was counterbalanced across participants,
but kept constant for each participant throughout the whole practice and experimental sessions, to avoid confusion. Partic-
ipants were asked to indicate how free they felt their choice had been by clicking with the cursor on the appropriate position.
Participants were reminded that they could use the whole range of the VAS.
The maximum response time for the number selection and the voluntariness rating was 5 s. If participants had given no
response after this time had elapsed, a message appeared and the next trial started.
First, we compared conditions of free choice versus instructed choice in a classical context (see below), operationally de-
ﬁned in the same way as the classical literature on free/instructed choices. Second, in an objective context, participants per-
formed the free and instructed conditions again, but each trial was followed by a rating of how free they felt their
immediately-preceding action choice had been. Finally, in the crucial subjective context, participants chose which of several
actions to make following presentation of a suggestive stimulus, and rated on a continuous scale the extent to which their
action choice had been free or not free, with respect to the information given in the suggestive stimulus.
The subjective context necessarily involved a subjective rating, whilst the classical context did not, making it difﬁcult to
compare these conditions directly. The objective context was designed to get round this problem, by providing a condition
which was informationally equivalent to the classical context, but also included the element of introspective report. In this
way, BOLD activity associated with the objective context could be contrasted with activity in the subjective context because
both contexts included both an action selection and a judgement event in each trial.
2.2.1. Classical context
With the classical context, we aimed at identifying patterns of BOLD signal associated with actions that have been clas-
sically treated as free. In free trials, the presented sequence was always ‘‘X X X X’’. In these trials, participants were free to
Fig. 1. Experimental paradigm. (A) General timing of events. Four numbers or four Xs were displayed on the screen (in the ﬁgure, # represents either a
number or an X. The symbol # was never actually displayed in the experiment). Participants chose a number by clicking on it with a trackball. Participants
were then asked to click on a visual analogue scale to rate how free their choice had been. (B) The classical context was used to identify regions of interest
associated with the contrast free > instructed in independent data. In the objective context (C) trials were deﬁned as free or instructed a priori. In objective
free trials, a series of four X’s was displayed and participants were free to choose any number from the response grid. In objective instructed trials,
participants saw a sequence of four identical numbers (‘‘1 1 1 1’’ in this example) and participants were asked to complete the sequence by clicking on the
same number that was displayed. Participants then indicated their feeling of voluntariness. In the subjective context (D) four numbers were displayed, and
participants were asked to complete the sequence with the ﬁfth number ‘‘in order to keep the sequence looking random’’ (see Section 2 for details). Trials
were then classiﬁed a posteriori according to a median split of each participant’s subjective reports.
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one single number repeated four times (e.g., ‘‘1 1 1 1’’). In these trials, participants were instructed to choose the number that
was displayed on the screen (i.e., 1).
The classical context was effectively used as a localizer, to deﬁne regions of interest (ROIs). The BOLD activity for the other
two contexts was analysed for ROIs identiﬁed independently from the data from the classical context.
2.2.2. Objective context
Our main aimwas to compare the brain correlates of the extreme free and instructed conditions with those of a subjective
context in which participants could themselves report how free their choice had been by means of a VAS (see below). In or-
der to make the two contexts comparable, we included a VAS rating in the objective context. In this way, any BOLD activity
differences between the objective and the subjective contexts could not be attributed to the mere presence of the VAS.
2.2.3. Subjective context
With the subjective context, we aimed at providing participants with a scenario in which they could experience a graded
sense of more or less free choice. Unlike in the other two contexts, the numerical stimulus presented in each trial contained a
pseudorandomized sequence of numbers. Participants were instructed to use this sequence as a suggestive guide for their
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folk knowledge would guide participants in their choices (Nickerson, 2002). Each participant might have felt highly con-
strained by some preceding sequences, and very unconstrained by other sequences. Participants were asked to report
choices as being less and more free in those trials respectively. The beliefs and strategies would differ from person to person,
and were not relevant for our purposes. Instead, we used random sequence generation as a means to provide participants
with a graded and reportable experience of voluntariness, in the sense of freedom from constraint. We could then use this
to investigate the brain activity associated with the experience of voluntariness.
The numerical stimulus therefore served to prompt the next action choice to some extent. The extent to which it did so
was assumed to inﬂuence the experience of subjective freedom of choice. Any of a number of rules could relate the numerical
stimulus to the chosen action. We chose to ask them to make the stimulus ‘‘look random’’, and to report their subjective feel-
ing of freedom of choice. The precise form of the completion rule used may have varied across participants and was irrelevant
to our purposes. Instead, we were interested in the extent of constraint provided by the numerical stimulus and the rule,
which participants were asked to report. We assumed that subjective reports of freedom of choice were informative of this
relative constraint. In this way, voluntariness was not directly manipulated experimentally. Instead, introspection was taken
as a reliable method to report subjective experience.
It is important to emphasise that, unlike previous studies (e.g., van Eimeren et al., 2006) here we did not assume that the
subjective feelings of voluntariness would directly correlate with the number of available alternatives. Instead, we gave par-
ticipants a complex rule and allowed them to interpret it. In that way, we hoped to distil the bases of the feelings of volun-
tariness, independently from any preconceptions from the experimenter’s part.
The sequences for the subjective context were generated by a pseudorandomized procedure. We deﬁned a measure of
‘‘stimulus space’’ for each sequence as the number of different numbers present in the stem (irrespective of position). The
sequences ‘‘3 3 3 3’’; ‘‘2 2 1 2’’; ‘‘3 1 4 4’’ and ‘‘2 3 4 1’’ are examples of sequences with stimulus spaces of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respec-
tively. We distributed the total 160 subjective trials into 4 blocks of 40 trials. Pilot results suggested that participants’ ratings
of subjective freedom of choice were related to the size of stimulus space. Therefore, each block contained sequences with
equal numbers with all possible stimulus spaces. The sequences for the subjective context were the same for all participants,
to allow for potential comparisons across participants. Their order of appearance was randomized across blocks and trials.
Additionally in the subjective context, a memory question was displayed every 10 trials. A four-number sequence was
presented and participants were asked if that sequence had been presented in the preceding 10 trials, with a maximum re-
sponse time of 5 s. This memory question was aimed at encouraging participants to pay attention to the number stimuli pre-
sented on every trial, and the responses were not analysed.
Each participant performed two consecutive blocks of 40 trials in each of the classical and objective contexts. They also
performed 4 consecutive blocks of 40 trials in the subjective context, which formed the key focus of the study. The order of
the contexts was randomized across participants.
Before scanning, participants were trained with at least one practice block for each context, always in the same order:
classical; objective, subjective. Training continued until participants felt comfortable with the task. The experiment in the
scanner lasted approximately 70 min.
After scanning, participants completed ﬁve personality questionnaires addressing feelings of control (Rotter, 1967) belief
in free will (the free will and determinism scale (Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008); the social desirability scale (Crowne &
Marlowe, 1960); and two self-control questionnaires (Rosenbaum, 1980; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004)). In addition
participants completed a semi-structured questionnaire about the strategies they had adopted in the completion of the ran-
dom number sequences.
2.3. fMRI data acquisition
Participants were positioned head ﬁrst and supine in the magnet bore. Images were collected with a 3T Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using an 8-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, 176 high-reso-
lution anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [TR = 2500 ms, TE = 2.58 ms, image
matrix = 256  256, FOV = 220 mm, ﬂip angle = 7, slice thickness = 0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 mm  0.86 mm  0.86 mm (re-
sized to 1 mm  1 mm  1 mm)]. Whole brain functional images were collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence, sensitive
to BOLD contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 35 ms, image matrix = 64  64, FOV = 224 mm, ﬂip angle = 80, slice thick-
ness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17%, voxel size 3.5 mm  3.5 mm  3 mm, 30 axial slices). A varying number of images were
acquired per run owing to the self-paced initiation of trials.
2.4. Data processing and analysis
Trials with reaction times (RTs) (for either the number choice or the voluntariness rating) shorter than 0.2 s or longer than
5 s were discarded from the analysis. Instructed trials with incorrect responses were also discarded.
Trials from the classical and objective contexts were classiﬁed into ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘instructed’’ according to the stimulus pre-
sented in each trial: e.g., ‘‘1 1 1 1’’, ‘‘2 2 2 2’’ etc. were classiﬁed as instructed, and ‘‘X X X X’’ was classiﬁed as free. In contrast,
trials from the subjective context were classiﬁed into ‘‘feels free’’ and ‘‘feels instructed’’ by means of a median split on the
distribution of each participants’ subjective reports. The median for each participant was calculated on the basis of all the
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‘‘instructed’’ is not identical across contexts, so the design is not fully factorial. Rather, our interest focussed on assessing
whether the different ways of deﬁning free and instructed in the different contexts would be based on qualitatively different
neural structures.
The fMRI data were analysed with statistical parametric mapping, using the SPM8 software (Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK). The ﬁrst four scans of all EPI series were excluded from the analysis
to minimise T1 relaxation artefacts. A mean image for all scan volumes was created, to which individual volumes were spa-
tially realigned by rigid body transformation. The high resolution structural image was coregistered with the mean image of
the EPI series. The structural image was normalised to the Montreal Neurological Institute template. The normalisation
parameters were then applied to the EPI images to ensure an anatomically informed normalisation. A commonly applied ﬁl-
ter of 8 mm FWHM (full-width at half maximum) was used. The time series data at each voxel were processed using a high-
pass ﬁlter with a cut-off of 128 s to remove low-frequency drifts. The subject-level statistical analyses were performed using
the general linear model. The events were deﬁned as the onset time of the stem and response grid. Movement times were
also included as parametric regressors to account for variance associated with simple motor activations. All resulting vectors
were convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) and its temporal derivative to form the main
regressors in the design matrix (the regression model). Realignment parameters in all 6 dimensions were also entered in
the model to account for variance associated with head motion. The statistical parameter estimates were computed sepa-
rately for each voxel for all columns in the design matrix. Contrast images were constructed from each individual to compare
the relevant parameter estimates for the regressors containing the canonical HRF. The group-level random effects analysis
was then performed. The resulting maps were thresholded with p < .001 and cluster-size corrected by means of Monte Carlo
simulation. Accordingly signiﬁcant effects were reported when the volume of the cluster was greater than the Monte Carlo
simulation determined minimum cluster size volume (25 voxels), above which the probability of type I error was below 0.05
(Cox, 1996).
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural results
Voluntariness ratings varied widely both within and between participants. To investigate variation between participants,
we calculated the median of each participant’s voluntariness ratings across all blocks. This median had a mean value across
participants of 4.05 (±1.68 SD). Variation within participants was considered as a function of free vs instructed trials. Trials in
the classical and objective contexts were classiﬁed as free or instructed a priori; whilst trials in the subjective context were
classiﬁed a posteriori, on the basis of the participants’ subjective reports. To validate the design and analysis, we examined
the overall distribution (for all participants) of the ratings of voluntariness for the objective free and instructed conditions
separately. Overall, the proportion of free trials (‘‘X X X X’’ displayed) subjectively classiﬁed as instructed was 0.041%, and the
proportion of instructed trials (e.g. ‘‘2 2 2 2’’ displayed) subjectively classiﬁed as free was 0.043%. This shows that an a pos-
teriori classiﬁcation criterion (according to voluntariness ratings) closely matched the a priori classiﬁcation criterion (accord-
ing to the information presented in the stimulus). This implies that in the objective condition, participants used the VAS
participants as we expected.
To evaluate whether there were any differences in behaviour across conditions, mean RTs were obtained for free and in-
structed conditions (see Fig. 2). Because the meaning of free and instructed was not identical in the objective and subjectiveFig. 2. Mean reaction times across participants for all free and instructed trials in the objective and subjective conditions. Subjective instructed conditions
were associated with longer reaction times than subjective free conditions (p < .001).
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using paired t-tests. There were no differences between the RTs for free and instructed trials in the objective context
(t22 = 0.68, p = .503). However, instructed trials in the subjective context were consistently associated with longer RTs, as
compared to free trials in the subjective context (t22 = 4.93, p < .001). This may reﬂect the fact that instructed conditions
in the subjective context imposed more complex restrictions on the possible choices, and therefore slower selection
processes.
3.1.1. Subjective context – behavioural analysis
As an initial approach to the behavioural analysis of the chosen numbers, we examined whether participants were fol-
lowing an exclusion rule for the stem completion task. The reported voluntariness ratings might then simply reﬂect exclu-
sion behaviour. We classiﬁed trials in a binary fashion. Exclusion trials were deﬁned as those in which the number chosen
was not included in the presented stimulus space. In contrast, inclusion trials were those in which the number chosen was
included in the stimulus space. This analysis could only be computed for trials with at least one number repetition. Results
showed that participants predominantly excluded the numbers present in the stimulus space. We computed the exclusion
ratio as the proportion of exclusion trials to the total number of valid trials. The mean exclusion ratio was 0.63 ± 0.15 (±SD),
and was signiﬁcantly different from 0.5, which would indicate no preference for exclusion behaviour (t22 = 4.06, p < .001).
However, the voluntariness ratings were not solely related to an exclusion vs. inclusion factor. The voluntariness ratings
for exclusion trials and inclusion trials were 4.82 ± 1.54 and 4.08 ± 1.6 respectively, and they were not signiﬁcantly different
(t22 = 1.7, p = .1).
To further analyse which factors may have inﬂuenced participants’ feelings of voluntariness, we investigated whether the
number of different digits in the presented sequence (i.e., the ‘‘stimulus space’’) might determine the degree of perceived
voluntariness. We therefore computed the correlation between the size of the stimulus space and the voluntariness rating
for each subject (see Fig. 3). A trend analysis revealed a signiﬁcant and positive linear relationship F(1,22) = 18.16, p < .001)
between feeling of voluntariness and stimulus space size. A sequence with only one number represented (e.g., ‘‘3 3 3 3’’) has
a stimulus space of 1. These sequences with small stimulus spaces were associated with responses having the lowest volun-
tariness ratings, perhaps because participants experienced such stimuli as strongly discouraging a free choice ‘‘3’’ as the re-
sponse. In contrast, sequences with stimulus spaces of 4 (e.g., ‘‘3 2 1 4’’) were associated with the highest voluntariness
ratings, perhaps because they appeared to offer no particular constraint on participants’ choice. While these suggested expla-
nations of perceived voluntariness as interesting possibilities, they are tangential to our main aim, to investigate the neural
correlates of perceived voluntariness.
3.2. fMRI results
3.2.1. Classical context, free vs. instructed
We ﬁrst indentiﬁed brain areas showing a differential BOLD activity for the two externally-deﬁned conditions; free and
instructed. This contrast served effectively as a functional localizer. The brain areas identiﬁed were used to deﬁne regions of
interest (ROIs) in which BOLD activity for free and instructed trials was analysed for the independent data obtained from the
remaining two contexts.Fig. 3. Average across participants of feelings of voluntariness as a function of the size of the stimulus space. Stimulus space is deﬁned as the number of
different digits present in the sequence shown. The sequences ‘‘3 3 3 3’’; ‘‘2 2 1 2’’; ‘‘3 1 4 4’’ and ‘‘2 3 4 1’’ are examples of sequences with stimulus spaces of
1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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etal sulcus (IPL) left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left premotor cortex (PMC) (see Table 1). These ﬁndings are
consistent with existent report of free action > instructed action contrasts (Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2004, 2006).
3.2.2. ROI analysis in objective and subjective contexts
The ROIs identiﬁed in the free > instructed contrasts in the classical context were tested in independent data from the two
other contexts; namely subjective and objective contexts.
Free and instructed conditions could not be taken to be equivalent across the objective and subjective contexts, for two
main reasons. First, free and instructed conditions in the subjective case were expected to relate to degrees of voluntariness
along a continuum, rather than representing categorically different situations. Second, ‘‘noise’’ due to errors in subjective re-
port might have reduced the strength of the contrast between free and instructed conditions in the subjective context, rel-
ative to the objective context. For these reasons, a factorial analysis was not appropriate. Instead, for each separate context,
we compared per cent signal change for free and forced conditions. This analysis was done within each of the ROIs identiﬁed
by the free > instructed contrast in the classical context (see Fig. 4 and Table 2).
The only difference between the classical context, used to identify the ROIs, and the objective context is that the latter
also included a VAS judgement. Thus, unsurprisingly, all six ROIs analysed showed increased levels of BOLD activity in
the free condition as compared to the instructed conditions in the objective context.
Strikingly however, when this analysis was repeated in the subjective context, the pattern of BOLD activity did not match
the one in the classical context (see Fig. 4 and Table 2). Indeed, in ﬁve of the six ROIs analysed, the difference in BOLD activity
between free and instructed conditions was reversed in the subjective context compared to the objective context. In two
ROIs (right IPL and left PM) this reversed pattern was statistically signiﬁcant. In these areas, BOLD activity was statistically
lower for actions that had felt free as compared to actions that had felt less free, but was nevertheless statistically higher for
actions that were objectively free, as compared to instructed.
3.2.3. Subjective context – whole brain analysis
BOLD activity associated with voluntary choice as identiﬁed by subjective report did not match with that identiﬁed by a
classical contrast between free and instructed actions. Speciﬁcally, in those areas identiﬁed by classical free > instructed
choice, we found no evidence for stronger activity when participants felt subjectively more free compared to when they felt
subjectively less free. In this sense, objectively and subjectively deﬁned free choice did not overlap. However, no direct infer-
ences about an interaction effect can be made by the simple combination of one signiﬁcant and one non-signiﬁcant t-test
(Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011). Therefore, to further examine the mechanisms associated with the feel-
ing of voluntariness, and their relationship to the objective operationalization of free action, we did a whole-brain analysis
for the contrast free > instructed (median split) in the subjective context controlling for stimulus space and RT by including
them as regressors in the ﬁrst-level model. Only one area, in the medial postcentral region, showed increased BOLD signal for
this contrast after whole-brain correction by means of a Monte Carlo simulation (see Fig. 5). BOLD signal showed two peaks
of activity in this region, in MNI coordinates (x = 4 y = 21 z = 49) and (x = 0 y = 28 z = 53. This pattern of BOLD activation
did not share any commonalities with the pattern found for the contrast free > instructed in the objective context, conﬁrming
the results from the ROI analysis.
Finally, we looked for BOLD signal activations that were parametrically modulated by the subjective rating of voluntar-
iness in a whole brain analysis. No areas showed BOLD that survived the correction for multiple comparisons.
4. Discussion
Free action has classically been operationalized as action in underdetermined external environments. It has been con-
trasted to instructed action, in which actions are fully speciﬁed by external stimuli. Although this objective operationaliza-
tion does not make explicit reference to the subjective experience of acting freely, the objective and subjective freedom of
action are often implicitly assumed to be related, see for example (Goldberg, Ullman, & Malach, 2008).Table 1
Results of whole brain analysis in the classical context (free > instructed). The RCZ/SMA cluster extends to both rostral cingulate zone and supplementary motor
area and is ambiguously identiﬁed by different toolboxes. RCZ, rostral-cingulate zone; SMA, supplementary motor area; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; DLPFC,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PC, precuneus.
Area Peak coordinates (MNI space) Peak z-score Cluster size (number of voxels)
x y z
Right IPL 35 63 42 5.42 206
Left IPL 28 70 46 4.88 217
RCZ/SMA 4 18 49 4.82 286
Left DLPFC 35 49 7 4.70 113
Precuneus 11 70 53 4.62 85
Left PM 42 4 39 4.20 112
Fig. 4. Effect of subjective feeling of free action in brain areas deﬁned by objective freedom of action. Results of the ROI analysis for RCZ/SMA, right and left
IPL, left DLPFC and left PMC. ROIs were deﬁned on the basis of the free > instructed contrast in the classical context. Percent signal change from data from
two independent datasets were then determined in those ROIs. BOLD activations from the objective context correspond to that found in the classical
context. On the contrary, BOLD signal from the subjective context follows an inverse pattern in all but one (the precuneus) of the ROIs identiﬁed. Error bars
show standard error of the mean. RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; SMA, supplementary motor area; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; PC, precuneus.
Table 2
Results of statistical tests for each region of interest, as identiﬁed by the free > instructed localizer, derived from the independent data in the classical context.
Region of interest (peak MNI coordinates) Pairwise comparisons
Free – instructed in objective context Free – instructed in subjective context
t p t p
RCZ/SMA (4 18 49) 7.13 <.001 1.33 .19
lDLPFC (35 49 7) 4.54 <.001 1.23 .23
lIPL (28 –70 46) 4.83 <.001 1.02 .32
rIPL (35 –63 42) 3.31 .003 2.05 .05
lPM (42 4 39) 3.80 <.001 2.07 .05
Precuneus (11 –70 53) – – – –
E. Filevich et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2013) 1271–1284 1279We have investigated the relation between the classic operational deﬁnitions of free and instructed action and the sub-
jective feeling of acting freely. Participants chose in each trial one out of four response alternatives. We measured BOLD acti-
vations in classical conditions in which these free and instructed actions were deﬁned in the objective, classical way, either
leaving the response choice to the participant (free trials), or fully specifying the required response in each trial (instructed
trials). Our results were in line with previous literature. In particular, we conﬁrmed that medial frontal and parietal BOLD
activity is associated with free actions. Results of the comparison between free and instructed conditions showed signiﬁ-
cantly greater BOLD responses for free compared with instructed in RCZ/SMA, left DLPFC, bilateral IPL and left PMC. These
results are consistent with previous reports (Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2004, 2006). When participants were
Fig. 5. Subjective free > subjective instructed in whole brain (blue) and objective free > objective forced (green). Panels (A–C) show coronal, sagittal and
axial planes respectively. Blue: Postcentral region showing increased BOLD signal for the contrast free > instructed in the median split data from the
subjective context. BOLD signal peaked at MNI coordinates (x = 4 y = 21 z = 49) and (x = 0 y = 28 z = 53). Results from this contrast in the subjective
context are non-overlapping with those from the same contrast in the classical context (green). BOLD activations were corrected for multiple comparisons
by means of a Monte Carlo simulation (p < .001, minimum cluster size: 25 voxels).
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operational deﬁnitions of free and instructed choice, and BOLD contrasts replicated previous studies. This part of our results
is broadly consistent with the classical view of voluntary action, and conﬁrms a relation between internal generation of ac-
tion and the experience of volition (Krieghoff et al., 2011).
We next compared this pattern of BOLD activations with those obtained in a subjective context where participants se-
lected actions according to the combination of a numerical stimulus stem and a completion rule (‘‘look random’’). The com-
pletion rule aimed at providing each participant with a situation in which they could experience an ecologically valid graded
sense of voluntariness.
We assumed that participants might use completion rules to conform to the required ‘‘random appearance’’ of sequences.
The precise completion rule (e.g., repetition avoidance, (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994) could vary across participants according
to their conceptions of randomness.
Although the completion rule was not considered to be critical in the context of this experiment, we also investigated
participants’ number choices, and voluntariness ratings. As an initial approach, we measured the number of exclusion trials
(those in which the number chosen was not included in the presented stem). Participants indeed tended to base their num-
ber choice on an exclusion strategy. Crucially however, the mean voluntariness ratings did not differ between exclusion trials
and inclusion trials, suggesting that participants based their voluntariness ratings on other factors, and that the BOLD con-
trast between choices subjectively rated as free vs. instructed cannot be simply explained by exclusion-related activity.
Also, and as it was mentioned above, stems with large stimulus spaces (i.e., no number repetitions) did not allow partic-
ipants to use an exclusion rule, but were at the same time rated most consistently as free. Therefore, the ability to use an
exclusion rule (i.e., simply choose the number that is not included in the stem) is unlikely to be the core of feeling free.
However, the actual rules used for ‘‘random’’ generation are not relevant for our analysis, and the requirement to generate
random numbers served merely to provide a plausible response space within which some responses might seem more free
than others. We considered this subjective experience, independently of the precise completion rule adopted, and of the par-
ticular response given. We contrasted trials associated with higher subjective ratings to those with lower subjective ratings
of voluntariness.
The neural correlates of the subjective feeling of freedom were quite different from the neural correlates of free choice as
classically operationalized. Our ROI analysis revealed that in ﬁve of the ROIs identiﬁed (ACC, bilateral IPL, left DLPFC and left
PMC), BOLD activity in the objective context was higher for free trials as compared with instructed trials. In stark opposition,
in the subjective context BOLD activity showed a trend to be lower for free trials in these ﬁve ROIs. Only one area, the pre-
cuneus, showed the same pattern of BOLD activity in the objective and subjective contexts. Univariate increases in precuneus
BOLD activity are not typically associated with voluntary action. Instead, the precuneus has been linked to self-referential
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can predict outcomes of free choices (Soon et al., 2008). This may speculatively suggest a hierarchical position for the pre-
cuneus in the free generation of response alternatives.
A whole brain fMRI analysis identiﬁed a cluster of BOLD activation in a medial postcentral area correlating with the re-
ported subjective feelings of free > instructed choices. This did not overlap with any of the areas identiﬁed by the free > in-
structed contrast in the classical context. Our results suggest that the classic operationalization of free action and the
subjective experience of choosing freely are dissociated.
An account of voluntary action based on subjective report revealed a brain area that had not been reported before in this
context. The increase in BOLD activity in the medial postcentral cortex correlated with the subjective feeling of freedom in
choosing actions, but was not related to the objective informational deﬁnition of free action. Therefore, we argue that the
feeling of acting freely in naturalistic situations may be independent of the classical free/instructed distinctions.
Our results give rise to three main questions. First, why does the subjective experience of acting freely dissociate from the
classical experimental manipulations of free action? Second, what is the functional relevance of the postcentral area found to
be related to subjective feelings of acting freely? And ﬁnally, what is the signiﬁcance of subjective report in the study of
volition?
4.1. Why are objective and subjective contexts dissociated?
To understand why the subjective experience of acting freely does not correspond to the objective operationalization of
free action, we examined which responses were reported to be based on free choices.
We compared the mean voluntariness ratings across all possible stimulus set sizes (where the stimulus set size was de-
ﬁned at the number of different numbers present in the stem). Participants judged that sequences with low stimulus spaces
(e.g. ‘‘3 3 3 3’’) were felt more instructed ones, perhaps because a voluntary response to these sequences would have strongly
precluded choosing the repeated response (e.g., ‘‘3’’). In contrast, sequences with stimulus spaces of 4 (e.g., ‘‘3 2 1 4’’) were
associated with the highest voluntariness ratings, perhaps because they appeared to offer no particular constraint on partic-
ipants’ choice.
This behavioural result interestingly suggests that perceived voluntariness in our task is not related to the number of
available alternatives but from how strongly the environment is interpreted as precluding otherwise available alternatives.
We do not know the rules or mechanisms that participants used to select actions in the subjective context. Therefore, the
cognitive processes in subjective and objective contexts may differ, limiting our ability to compare them. However, we
cross-validated perceived voluntariness ratings with the free/instructed conditions in the objective context. The success
of this validation suggests that our design would reveal any possible contribution of the brain mechanisms for free choice
of action to subjective voluntariness. Since no such contribution was found, we tentatively conclude that subjective volun-
tariness dissociates from the brain systems that are objectively involved in internal generation of action.
4.2. Alternative accounts
Several alternative explanations for the dissociation between objective and subjective context should be considered here.
We found differences in the patterns of BOLD activity associated with the free > instructed contrast between the objective
and subjective contexts. Clearly, the two contexts differed in more than one respect. For example, the subjective context re-
quired a complex evaluation of the number sequence and may have recruited random generation processes (Jahanshahi
et al., 2000). In addition, our design included a memory question about the number sequences in the subjective, but not
the objective context. However, we argue that the differences in BOLD activity that we identiﬁed between objective and sub-
jective contexts cannot be easily explained by differences in task demands. Mental processes such as random number gen-
eration would have occurred in both free and forced trials within the subjective context, and in none of the trials in the
objective context. Consequently, the comparison between free and forced trials within each context would have subtracted
out any potential BOLD activity that was directly related to differential task demands.
Additionally, the differences in patterns of BOLD activations may be related to the nature of the free/instructed distinction
in each context. There is a strong and categorical difference between free and instructed trials in the objective context. Con-
versely, the difference between free and instructed trials in the subjective context is slight and gradual. One might therefore
predict smaller differences between free and forced conditions in the subjective context as compared to the objective con-
text. This was not the case. There was a trend in all ROIs identiﬁed (except the precuneus) for an inversion of the pattern of
BOLD activation in the subjective context, as compared with the objective context. This trend became signiﬁcant in two of
the 6 ROIs analysed, namely the right IPL and left PM. More importantly, the free > instructed contrast in the subjective con-
text revealed signiﬁcant increases in BOLD activity in the postcentral area that were not signiﬁcant in the objective context.
To account for an inversion in patterns of BOLD activity, it would be necessary to appeal to an implausible inversion of the
meaning of the terms ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘instructed’’ on the part of our participants. Therefore, we argue that simple differences in
the nature of free and instructed contexts cannot easily account for the results reported here.
Instead, we argue that the subjective feeling of acting freely may be associated with increased BOLD activity in the post-
central area. However, other more speculative explanations cannot be ruled out. For example, activity in the medial
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task processing such as the amount of information that was taken into consideration for the number choice.
Importantly however, previous data do not strongly support these alternative accounts. In particular, increases in task
difﬁculty are typically associated with prefrontal, rather than medial-central, areas (e.g., Barch et al., 1997).
4.3. The role of restricted choice on BOLD activity
Trials in the subjective context represent an intermediate situation, between the two objective extremes of free and in-
structed actions. In other words, even those trials subjectively judged as instructed will require a certain degree of choice.
Two relevant studies have addressed the effect of varying degrees of choice on BOLD activity. Forstmann, Brass, Koch, and
Von Cramon (2006) designed a task selection experiment, in which participants were either instructed on which task to per-
form, or could choose the task between either two or three task alternatives. They found that BOLD activity in RCZ was higher
for task choice conditions, but did not vary with the scope of choice (i.e., two vs. three possible tasks). This may explain why
we did not ﬁnd BOLD signal increases in the classical areas related to free choice in the subjective context. However, and
importantly, limited set of response alternatives cannot readily explain the increase in BOLD activity in the medial postcen-
tral region.
In a previous study (van Eimeren et al., 2006) participants were asked to freely select one out of a number of available
response alternatives, ranging from 1 to 4. This design, which did not include a subjective judgement component, allowed
the authors to compare conditions of no selection (one available alternative) and restricted selection (between 2 and 3 avail-
able alternatives. If the medial postcentral activation is simply due to a limited availability of alternatives, then we should
also have found the activation observed in the study by van Eimeren et al. (2006) in the contrast of restricted selection > no
selection conditions. Their contrast revealed increased BOLD activity in frontal, premotor and parietal areas, but not in the
medial postcentral cortex that we report here. The results by Van Eimeren (2006) do not support the possibility that the
BOLD activation in the medial postcentral area is simply related to the limited response space of alternatives.
4.4. What is the function of the medial postcentral region?
Could the activation in the medial postcentral area be due to a confound in our task, rather than a true correlate of expe-
rience of free choice? Here we examine this possibility.
In tasks requiring free selection, human participants typically hold their previous responses in working memory. Moni-
toring the contents of working memory can then prevent repetition of behaviour, and can promote generation of seemingly
random response sequences (Goldman & Rosvold, 1970). Consequently, working memory acts as a confound that is hard to
separate from free selection. Increased working memory load has been associated with increases in BOLD activity in IPL
(Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000), but not in DLPFC (Hadland, Rushworth, Passingham, Jahanshahi,
& Rothwell, 2001). Given that the objective context led to relatively little cognitive load, it is possible that participants were
additionally monitoring their previous history of choices when selecting a response. This would have meant increased work-
ing memory function in the objective context. . On the other hand, the more cognitively demanding subjective context may
have precluded working memory effects on free trials. This could explain the attenuation of BOLD activity in the ROIs we
analysed. However, we found not just attenuation, but an inversion of the free-instructed difference in the subjective com-
pared to the objective context. Working memory accounts cannot easily explain this inversion.
The phenomenology of free action has rarely been addressed experimentally, despite a strong theoretical interest in the
issue (Nahmias, Morris, & Nadelhoffer, 2004), but see (Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004). The paracentral area that
we found to correlate with the experience of free choice has been related to resting state activity (Mazoyer et al., 2001) and
default network functions (Mason et al., 2007). However, this area is not generally identiﬁed as a core component of the de-
fault mode network. Nevertheless, our data remain compatible with the idea that this area may be linked to reﬂective pro-
cesses that give rise to the conscious feeling of free will (Goldberg et al., 2008).
4.5. What is the value of relying on subjective experience?
Subjective report provides unique access to phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 1997), but is notoriously problematic
as a guide to neural bases of experience Guggisberg, Dalal, Schnider, and Nagarajan (2011) have recently considered neural
correlates of subjective experience related to voluntary action. In an MEG study, the authors investigated the neural sub-
strates of sensory events, of actual movements, and of intentions to move. In addition, they characterised the neural sub-
strates of introspection about the timing of each of these events. They found that the spatial extent of the neural
correlates of introspection of events did not match the neural loci of the ﬁrst order events at which introspection was direc-
ted (but see Lau et al. (2004) for the opposite result). Our study mirrors that by Guggisberg et al. (2011) in the sense that the
brain areas that underlie introspection about a given process (here the feeling of free choice between action alternatives) do
not necessarily match the ﬁrst order processes to which introspection refers (i.e., choosing between action alternatives).
Several other studies have directly addressed the subjective experience of intending to act. These studies have revealed an
involvement of both frontal and parietal areas in the phenomenology of intended action. For example, Fried et al. (1991)
found that direct electrical stimulation to medial frontal cortex led to subjective ‘‘urges’’ to act. More recently, Kühn and
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the ‘‘temporal binding’’ effect, an implicit marker of agency (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). On the other hand, Desmur-
get et al. (2009) reported the conscious experience of intending to act following direct stimulation of the parietal cortex.
These studies have associated medio-frontal and lateral parietal areas to the feeling of intended action, but not the postcen-
tral area that we report here. One important difference between those studies and ours should be pointed out. In those stud-
ies, the timing of action was not speciﬁed. Consequently, the subjective experience of action intention may be related to the
feeling of impending action. In our experiment, in contrast, an action was to be made at a speciﬁc time. Actions could only
differ in terms of their freedom of constraint by the external environment. Therefore, the subjective experience reported here
did not have to do with the feeling of being about to act, but rather with the feeling of internal generation of one of a range of
response alternatives.
Importantly, our results do not undermine the validity of classical operational distinctions between free and instructed
choice, nor do they rule out some relation between the operational distinction and the experience of voluntariness. However,
our results do suggest that the experience of voluntariness is not simply a consequence of the same brain processes involved
in free action selection. Where then, does the experience of free choice arise? There are at least two possibilities. First, the
feeling of freely choosing might be confabulated (Wegner, 2002), rather than being a bona ﬁde experience at all. Indeed, evi-
dence from choosing between alternative manual responses suggests that the experience of volition is only generated by
processes occurring after action selection, rather than before (Haggard & Eimer, 1999). On this view, the process of selection
itself would be phenomenally silent. Second, the experiences of voluntary choice might arise from a pathway parallel to the
(unconscious) pathway that generates action itself (Wegner, 2002).
4.6. Conclusion
Our experiment relates to the traditional philosophical question of ‘‘free will’’. Regardless of whether freedom of will ex-
ists or not, most people would agree that they generally feel that they choose their own actions (Nichols, 2011). We did not
aim to contribute to the debate over whether free will exists. Rather, we tried to investigate the experience of free will sci-
entiﬁcally. The subjective experience of free choice may be a phenomenal experience similar to other phenomenal experi-
ences, and dependent on a distinct neural substrate (Block, 1995). Our results suggest that this experience may not derive
from brain circuits involved in action selection, but from quite different brain circuits.
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